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Case No. 981046-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute and for cultivating a controlled substance, both third degree felonies in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (1998), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in 
and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Guy R. Bumingham, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Should this Court consider defendant's challenge to the search of the storage 
unit where he refused to assert an expectation of privacy in the unit? Because the trial 
assumed for the sake of expediency, without making findings or formally ruling, that 
defendant had asserted standing, this issue is before this Court for the first time on appeal, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
no standard of review applies. 
2. Was the trial court's finding that the search of the storage shed was executed 
under a signed warrant clearly erroneous? An appellate court reverses a trial court's 
findings of fact only if they are '"against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making 
them 'clearly erroneous.'" State v. 1.37 Acres of Real Property. 886 P.2d 534, 535 (Utah 
App. 1994) (citations omitted). In making such a determination, the appellate court views 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings. kL 
3. Did the trial court properly conclude that there was probable cause to search 
defendant's residence? On appeal, the appellate court does not conduct a de novo review 
of the magistrate's probable cause determination, see State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885 
(Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), but only 
"determines whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that 
there were enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed." State v. 
Potter, 860P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
2 
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C O N S T I T U T I O N A L P R O V I S I O N S . STATUTES, AND R U L E S 
The following determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are: 
Four th Amendmen t to the United s Consti tution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, nouses, , . 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E CASE 
. lenuant, Steven Knight, was charged w ith possession of mar ijuana in a drug 
free mi1111 11II I i 11sirib111e a sec;1111 r i d v \ i n x I e I \ n i mi11 \ 1 1 ) l a t i o n ;:)f I Itall: i Code ,"1 i in n 
§ 58-37-8(1), 8(5) (1998) (Couin A,, possession of dviw paraphernalia, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violai M r~ • u h C ode Ann § 58-37ao and § 58-37-8(5) (1998) 
(Count II), cultivating a controlled substance in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, 
i i i< >lati ; n i < >f 1 ) tah Code Ai in § 58 3 7 8(1) (1998) (Count III), ana possess!* )i:i of 
Code Arm. § 76-10-105 (1 ^ ) (Count IV) (R. 1 7-18). Defendant moved to si ippress 
evidence obtained in a search of his residence, and following an evidentiary hearing the 
trial c o u t du.kv. u*c motion (R. 62-64, I'M-10 <" I, Defendant entered conditional no 
i oiliest [iliii'i Inn | insscssion nl i i i i i i i | i i i i i i i i u l l i i (in II ci ill ID IIIIIII 111 ill H ill t, |< DIIIII 1), .iiiinl i u l lK . i l i ng 
acorilroiled iiihstancr M'DIIIII III) hold llunl de pri1!1 felonies preserving his right to • 
appeal the court 's denial of his motion to suppress, and the trial court dismissed Counts II 
3 
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and IV (R. 117, 122). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to statutory zero-to-
five year terms in the Utah State Prison, but suspended sentence and placed defendant on 
supervised probation for thirty-six months (R. 127). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On December 21, 1995, Provo Police Officer Devon Jensen received an 
anonymous tip that 85 pounds of marijuana was being kept in storage units # 172, 173, 
and # 175 at Storage USA, 1401 West Center St., Orem Utah (Affidavit in Support of 
Search Warrant for storage units, R. 52-54 at 54, attached at Addendum A). In the 
company of another officer handling "Rudy," a police service dog having extensive 
training and experience in the detection of controlled substances, went to Storage USA 
(R. 53-54). In two separate searches through the storage complex, one on lead and the 
other off, Rudy alerted on only storage units # 172, 173, and # 175 (R. 53-54). On these 
facts, Provo Police Officer Russell Billings sought and obtained a search warrant (R. 50-
51; 136:18-19). 
The same day, police, executing the warrant, searched the storage complex and 
1
 The facts are recited most favorably to the trial court's findings. State v. 
Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997) ("Because we are reviewing the trial 
court's decision denying defendant's motion to suppress, we recite the facts in a light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings.") (citing State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997). The State's statement of facts substantially restates facts set out in the 
affidavits supporting the two search warrants at issue in this case. With the possible 
exception of an asserted "inconsistency" in the amount of marijuana expected to found in 
the storage unit as opposed to that actually found (R. 63), defendant nowhere challenged 
the accuracy of the affidavits. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
found a six pound bale of marijuana in one of the designated storage units (Affidavit in 
Support of Search Warrant for defendant's house, R. 25-28 at 28, attached at Addendum 
B).2 The confidential informant ("CI#2") who informed police that marijuana would be 
found at the storage complex also told Officer Billings that the designated unit was rented 
by an individual known to him only as "Steve," and that this individual lived at 172 North 
920 West in Orem, Utah (R. 21)? Checking records of the Orem Police Department and 
Provo City Utilities, Officer Billings determined that a "Steven Knight," a person known 
to the police in several prior dealings, resided at the address given by the confidential 
informant (R. 27). 
The confidential informant also advised Officer Billings that defendant ("Steven 
Knight") had been dealing marijuana for several years, that defendant was often in 
possession of large quantities of marijuana both on his person and in his residence, that 
defendant rented storage units on a regular basis under fictitious names to store large 
quantities of marijuana, and that defendant had rented the designated storage unit in the 
name of an individual who lived just down the street from defendant (R. 27). Checking 
the records of the storage complex, Officer Billings learned that the designated storage 
2
 The storage units are connected by a common duct allowing air currents to send 
the odor of the controlled substances to adjacent units (R. 53). 
3
 In the affidavit in support of the search warrant on the storage units, Officer 
Jensen states that he received an "anonymous" (R. 54). That same "anonymous" person is 
identified by Officer Billings as the confidential informant ("CI#2").in his affidavit in 
support of the search warrant on defendant's house (R. 54, 27-28), and by the trial court 
in its ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress (R. 106). 
5 
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unit was rented in the name of a Justin Dzinblenski, who lived at 180 North 1106 West, a 
residence located just west of defendant's (R. 27). Based on the tip leading to the 
recovery of the marijuana in the designated storage unit, Officer Billings considered the 
confidential informant, who gave no false information, to be reliable (R. 26-27). 
The confidential informant further advised officers that defendant was receiving 
large quantities of marijuana from Utah County and sometimes paid for marijuana with 
guns (R. 27). Officer Billings received information that individuals in possession of a 
gun were involved in a marijuana buy on December 21, 1995, a transaction from which 
police obtained information leading to the search of the storage units (R. 27). This 
transaction occurred at night, a time when Officer Billings was aware that defendant 
conducted most of his narcotic transactions (R. 27). Finally, the confidential informant 
informed Officer Billings that during the past week he had observed defendant with large 
quantities of marijuana on his person (R. 26). Based on this second affidavit, police 
sought and obtained a search warrant to search defendant's residence (Search Warrant for 
defendant's residence, R. 29-30, attached at Addendum C). A search of defendant's 
residence uncovered marijuana, marijuana under cultivation, drug paraphernalia, and 
tobacco, and defendant was thereafter charged accordingly (R. 17-18, 33-34). The State 
did not file any charges relating to the marijuana seized from the storage unit (R. 
136:141). 
Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress, which the trial court denied (Ruling 
6 
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on Defendant's Motion to Suppress, "Ruling;9 R. 104-07 at 105-06, attached at 
Addendum D). The details of defendant's arguments, the State's response, and the 
evidence elicited at the suppression hearing are fully set out in the argument portion of 
this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's entire claim on appeal, that police searched the storage unit without a 
valid warrant and that without the fruits of the storage unit search there was insufficient 
probable cause to search his residence, are dependent on his establishing an expectation 
of privacy in the storage unit. However, because defendant has not at any point asserted a 
privacy interest in the storage unit, he has not established standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the search of the unit, and therefore, this Court need not consider the 
merits of defendant's claim on appeal. 
POINT II 
Defendant argues that because the search of the storage unit was executed upon an 
unsigned warrant the search was invalid. However, based on testimony which it plainly 
regarded as credible, the trial court found that the warrant had been signed and that the 
search was validly executed. Because defendant fails to adequately challenge the trial 
court's finding as clearly erroneous, his lengthy argument that the warrant was unsigned 
is irrelevant to the central issue on appeal. 
7 
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POINT III 
The affidavit in support of the storage shed stated several facts corroborating 
information freely given to police by the confidential informant and noting that the 
informant had seen defendant with large amounts of marijuana on his person, that a 
controlled buy led police to a marijuana characteristic of the way defendant was known to 
police to conduct sales of contraband. Thus, even assuming that the search of the storage 
unit was invalid, the affidavit amply set out facts which, independent of the discovery of 
marijuana in the storage unit, not only demonstrated that the confidential informant was 
reliable, but that there was probable cause to search defendant's house. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT AT ANY POINT ASSERTED A 
PRIVACY INTEREST IN THE STORAGE UNITS, HE HAS NOT 
ESTABLISHED STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEARCH OF THOSE UNITS 
"According to the Supreme Court, in order to challenge the propriety of a search, a 
defendant must first establish 'a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.'" 
State v. Scott. 860 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 
128, 143,99 S. Ct. 421,430 (1978)) (emphasis added); State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 
915 (Utah App. 1992) (same); accord State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056,1058 (Utah App. 
1992). The entire thrust of defendant's claims on appeal, to wit: police searched the 
8 
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storage unit without a valid warrant and that without the fruits of the storage unit search 
there was insufficient probable cause to search his residence, are dependent on his 
establishing an expectation of privacy in the storage unit. However, because defendant 
has not at any point asserted a privacy interest in the storage unit, he has not established 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search of the unit, and therefore, this 
Court need not consider the merits of defendant's claims on appeal.4 
A* Factual Background. 
Receiving only unsigned copies of the warrants and supporting affidavits for both 
searches in response to his discovery request, defendant moved to suppress evidence 
seized from his residence, vaguely challenging the validity of the search of the storage 
unit for lack of a signed warrant and the reliability of the confidential informant (R. 13, 
50-64).5 The State answered by arguing in support of the confidential informant's 
reliability, but principally argued that defendant's motion should be dismissed for failure 
to assert standing to challenge the search of the storage unit (R. 80-87). Defendant 
4
 The State's challenge to defendant's standing was, as discussed below, clearly 
presented to the trial court and supported by the record. However, the trial court 
sidestepped the challenge in the interest of expediency, ultimately concluding that the 
search of the storage unit was valid (R. 104-05). Thus, the State's claim is properly 
presented as an alternative argument on appeal. See State v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 357 
(Utah 1996) (requiring court of appeals to consider alternative ground for affirmance of 
convictions). 
5
 Prior to the July 11, 1997 hearing on the motion to suppress, the prosecutor 
provided to the trial court, and presumably defendant, a signed affidavit and warrant 
relating to the search of defendant's house (R. 25-30, 136:16). On appeal, defendant does 
not challenge the validity of these documents. 
9 
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responded, albeit without asserting a privacy interest in the storage units (R. 90-93, 98-
101). 
On July 11,1997 there was an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress (R. 136).6 On the issue of standing, the prosecutor again argued that defendant 
was required to establish his standing before being allowed to challenge the search of the 
storage units (R. 136:5-8). Defendant expressed reluctance to assert his standing because 
he feared it would expose him to possible charges stemming from the discovery of the 
marijuana in the storage unit (R. 136:9, 11). The trial court recognized that whether or 
not the search of the storage unit was valid, the crucial determination was whether there 
was probable cause for police to search defendant's residence (R. 136:11-13). Therefore, 
looking for an expedient way to reach the validity of the residential search, the trial court 
assumed for the purposes of the hearing only that defendant had asserted a privacy 
interest in the storage unit and directed the parties to proceed (R. 105, 136:11-14). 
B. Defendant Offered no Reasonable Basis for Refusing 
to Assert an Expectation of Privacy in the Storage Unit 
In his response to the State's challenge to his Fourth Amendment standing, 
6
 There was also an earlier, non-evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress on March 24,1997 (R. 65). The record of that hearing has not been made part 
of record on appeal. However, that hearing was held before the prosecution filed its 
responsive memorandum, raising for the first time the issue of defendant's failure to 
assert standing, and the trial court continued the matter (R. 65). Since the record was 
evidently most fully developed at the subsequent July 11, 1997 evidentiary hearing, the 
State considers the existing appellate record sufficient for this Court to rule on the merits 
of this issue. 
10 
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defendant argued that the State was effectively precluded from asserting the challenge 
based on the supporting affidavit, which implied defendant had an interest in the storage 
unit (R. 93). He further argued that the State could not consistently deny his standing to 
challenge the search of the storage unit and at the same time assert his interest in the 
storage unit in which the marijuana was found to support the search of his residence, 
allegedly the sole basis for probable cause to search his residence (R. 93). 
Defendant's argument is specious because it suggests (1) that it is the State's 
burden, rather than a defendant's, to assert a privacy interest in searched place, and (2) 
that it is the beliefs of the police, rather than the assertions of a defendant, that determine 
the existence of a defendant's privacy interest. In State v. Kolster, 869 P.2d 993 (Utah 
App. 1994), this Court rejected in a factually similar scenario the same arguments 
suggested by defendant in this case. 
In Kolster, the police received an anonymous tip informing them that the 
defendant would be receiving marijuana in a package bearing false names and mailed to a 
friend of the defendant's. IdL at 994. The police intercepted the package, identified the 
true names of the recipients, obtained a warrant, and opened the package and discovered 
marijuana. IdL Two days later police secured a second warrant to search the recipient's 
premises, found defendant on the premises, and arrested him for possession of a 
controlled substance. Id. Affirming the trial court's determination that the defendant had 
failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the package, this Court stated: 
11 
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First, [the defendant] has not demonstrated a subjective expectation 
of privacy in the searched package. [The defendant] never asserted a 
property or possessory interest in the package as required to show privacy 
expectations under Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, 99 S. Ct. at 433. [The 
defendant] simply argues that because narcotics officers learned from an 
anonymous source that he was the intended recipient, he somehow achieved 
a subjective expectation of privacy in the package. We disagree. "[A]n 
officer's belief is irrelevant to the question of a defendant's expectation of 
privacy." State v. DeAlo. 748 P.2d 194, 197 (Utah App. 1987). What an 
officer knew or believed is part of our legitimate expectation of privacy 
analysis only when a defendant has asserted to that officer a permissive or 
possessory interest in the object searched. See Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 916; 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 43 L 437 n.6 (Utah App. 1990V 
Koister, 869 P.2d at 995. 
As in Koister, defendant never asserted a possessory interest in the storage unit. 
Indeed, he equivocated in his response, stating that he had neither denied renting the unit 
nor argued that he had not, plainly refusing to assert such an interest (R. 99). At the 
suppression hearing, he plainly admitted that he had never asserted an interest in the 
storage unit, and again steadfastly refused to assert such an interest (R. 136:6, 9, 14).7 In 
7
 Defendant argued at the suppression hearing that he was reluctant to assert a 
possessory interest in the storage unit for the purpose of establishing standing for fear of 
exposing defendant to criminal liability for possession of the marijuana found in the unit, 
conduct not then charged (R. 136:9, 11). The argument fails to establish a sufficient basis 
for a defendant's evading the necessary assertion of an expectation of privacy. 
Commenting on the applicability of automatic standing, a theory defendant in this case 
also urged in his response (R. 92), the Washington Court of Appeals explained: 
The doctrine of automatic standing was abandoned under federal 
law because it no longer served the function for which it was created. 
The rule was designed to avoid the "'constitutional dilemma* of forcing a 
defendant charged with a possessory crime to choose between preserving" 
her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or invoking her 
Fourth Amendment rights. . . . However, in Simmons v. United States. 
390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a defendant's testimony in support of a motion to suppress 
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sum, because defendant's claims on appeal are fully dependant on his standing to assert a 
challenge to the search of the storage unit, standing which he has refused to assert, this 
court should decline to consider any of his claims urged on appeal. However, even 
considering defendant's claims, they are patently without merit. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING, THAT THERE EXISTED A VALIDLY 
SIGNED WARRANT FOR THE SEARCH OF THE STORAGE 
UNIT, WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, HIS ARGUMENT THAT 
THE SEARCH WAS INVALID BECAUSE THE WARRANT WAS 
UNSIGNED IS IRRELEVANT 
Defendant argues at length that because the warrant authorizing the search of the 
storage unit was not signed by a magistrate the search was invalid. Br. of App. at 11-20. 
The State does not dispute that the validity of an unsigned warrant is an arguable point. 
However, the argument defendant makes is irrelevant to this case. The trial court found 
that the warrant authorizing the search was signed, notwithstanding the prosecution's 
inability to produce a signed copy at the suppression hearing, a finding which defendant 
only indirectly challenges in presenting his misdirected claim. Br. of App. at 18. 
is not admissible as evidence of guilt at trial. Consequently, in fUnited 
States v.1 Salvucci. 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 
[(1980)], the Court abolished the federal automatic standing rule because, 
after Simmons, the risk of potential self- incrimination no longer existed. 
[Citation omitted.] 
State v. Carter. 875 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Wash. App. 1994), affd, 904 P.2d 290 (Wash. 1995). 
See also Kosder, 869 P.2d at 996 (finding automatic standing rule inapplicable). 
13 
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Because defendant has failed to show that the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous, 
defendant's argument that the search was conducted without a signed warrant is 
irrelevant, and this Court should decline to consider it. 
A* Review of a Trial Court*s Findings is Highly Deferential. 
In State v. Pena. the Utah Supreme Court set out a highly deferential standard for 
reviewing a trial court's findings of fact: 
Trial courts are given primary responsibility for making 
determinations of fact. Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court 
under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to find clear 
error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the trial court's determination. See Wessel v. 
Erickson Landscaping Co.. 711 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985); see also United 
States v. United States Gvpsum Co.. 333 U.S. 364. 395. 92 L. Ed. 746. 68 
S. Ct. 525 (1948). This standard is highly deferential to the trial court 
because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the 
evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered to be 
in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a 
sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot 
hope to garner from a cold record. In re J. Children. 664 P.2d 1158, 1161 
(Utah 1983). [Emphasis added.] 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). "Clear error is indicated when the trial 
court's factual assessment is against the clear weight of the evidence or it induces a firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed." State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303, 
(Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. Ashe. 745 P.2d 1255,1258 (Utah 1987)). 
B. Factual Background, 
At the suppression hearing, Officer Billings testified that, as to the search of the 
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storage units, he specifically remembered the case from his personal involvement, he was 
sure that he had a signed, sworn warrant at the time he searched the units, and that a 
return of warrant was subsequently filed with the court (R. 136:19-21). However, when 
he later checked with the court clerks, they were unable to locate anything in the file (R. 
136:19-20). He further testified that in the time period at issue he had served hundreds of 
warrants, that he did not recall the judge who signed the warrant to search the units, but 
that he had never served an unsigned warrant (R. 136:20-21). 
Finding credible and persuasive Officer Billings specific memory of this case and 
his assertion that he had never served an unsigned warrant, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion to suppress, finding that a valid warrant had been prepared for the 
search of the storage unit (Ruling, R. 105-04). 
C. Defendant Fails to Show that the Trial 
Court's Finding was Clearly Erroneous, 
Imbedded within defendant's ten-page argument that the search of the unit was 
improperly conducted without a signed warrant, is a single paragraph expressing 
defendant's doubt that a warrant ever existed because "no signed warrant was offered into 
evidence and the warrant's absence from the court's file [was] neither explained or [sic] 
otherwise accounted for." Br. of App. at 18. Considering the substantial deference given 
to the trial court, this oblique reference to the trial court's finding that the warrant was 
signed is insufficient to show that it was erroneous. Cf United States v. Hurd. 642 F.2d 
1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 1981) (refusing to find erroneous district court's finding that audio 
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tapes, having some omissions suggesting erasure, of defendant's conversations with 
government agents, had not been tampered with, based on testimony of agents); Evans v. 
State, 117 S.W.2d 462,462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938) (per curiam) (refusing to set aside 
trial court finding, that copy of lost or misplaced indictment which allegedly charged 
fewer offenses was a substantial copy of original indictment, because it was supported by 
some testimony). Indeed, having assumed the nonexistence of the warrant from the facts 
asserted, defendant immediately resumes his discussion of the dangers of unsupported 
searches based on unsigned warrants without any reference to the trial court's express 
finding. Br. of App. at 18-19. 
Further, defendant cites no authority in support of an argument that the trial court's 
finding was clearly erroneous. Rather, he cites Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 
1684 (1981), to support his principal claim that the Fourth Amendment is violated 
through an unreasonable search conducted without evidence of a valid warrant. Br. of 
App. at 17. Among other evidence plainly indicating that no warrant existed for a 
residential search, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that there was no testimony as to what 
the warrant contained, that the absence of the warrant was unexplained, and that there was 
nothing in the record indicating that the warrant in any way described the items 
eventually found. State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387,389 (Ohio 1960). Noting the Ohio 
Supreme Court's view of the warrant, and the police's illegal entry and inordinately 
forceful and highhanded manner in conducting the search, the United States Supreme 
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Court then went on to consider the only legal issue presented, holding that evidence 
obtained through an unconstitutional search or seizure was inadmissible in a state court. 
Mapp. 367 U.S. at 644-45, 655, 81 S. Ct. at 1686, 1691. Thus, in Mapp. the 
circumstances of the search, the lack of any genuine evidence that the warrant existed, 
and the legal issue before the Court were altogether distinguishable from the factual and 
legal issues in this case. 
In sum, defendant has failed to show that the trial court's finding that the warrant 
for the storage units had been properly prepared was clearly erroneous. However, even if 
this Court should find the trial court's finding clearly erroneous, and thus conclude that 
the search was conducted without a signed warrant, it would not effect the outcome of 
this case because there was probable cause to search defendant's residence without 
considering the marijuana discovered in the storage unit. See State v. Sampson. 808 P.2d 
1100, 1111 n. 19 (Utah App. 1990) (recognizing application of "independent source" 
doctrine as exception to warrant requirement, whereby evidence that has been discovered 
by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation is deemed admissible), cert. 
denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), cert, denied. 503 U.S. 914, 112 S. Ct. 1282-83 (1992). 
POINT III 
THE AFFIDAVIT AMPLY SETS FORTH EVIDENCE OF THE 
INFORMANT'S RELIABILITY AND PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
SUPPORT THE WARRANT AUTHORIZING THE SEARCH OF 
DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE 
Defendant claims that evidence seized in the search of his residence should be 
ct 
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suppressed for lack of probable cause. Specifically, he argues that (1) because the storage 
unit was not rented in his name, the confidential informant's reliability was not 
established, and (2) because probable cause for the search of his residence was based 
exclusively on the alleged illegal search of the storage unit and the consequent discovery 
of marijuana, there was insufficient probable cause to search his residence. Br. of App. at 
20-23. However, because the argument omits crucial facts demonstrating both the 
confidential informant's reliability and probable cause independent of the fruits of the 
storage unit search, defendant's claim fails. 
A. The Appellate Court Reviews the Magistrate's 
Determination of Probable Cause Deferentially. 
"Before issuing a search warrant, a neutral magistrate must review an affidavit 
containing specific facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause." State v. 
Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah App.1993) (citing State v. Purser. 828 P.2d 515, 517 
(Utah App. 1992)) (citation omitted). "In determining whether probable cause exists, the 
magistrate must 'make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of 
knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" Id (citing Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,239,103 S. Ct. 2317,2332 (1983)). 
On appeal, the appellate court does not conduct a de novo review of the 
magistrate's probable cause determination, see State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885 (Utah 
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App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), but only "determines 
whether the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there were 
enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable cause existed." Potter 860 P.2d at 
956 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the appellate court reviews the affidavit in '""its 
entirety and in a common sense fashion,"1" according deference to the magistrate's 
determination. State v. Jackson. 937 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied. 945 
P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 
Concerning an informant's reliability and its relation to probable cause, this Court 
has stated: 
Factors to consider in determining whether probable cause exists 
include an informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. Gates. 
462 U.S. at 233, 103 S. Ct. at 2329; State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 130 
(Utah 1987); State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990). In some 
cases, the circumstances may require the supporting affidavit to set forth in 
detail the basis of knowledge, veracity and reliability of a person supplying 
information in order to establish probable cause. State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 
1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). In other cases, if the circumstances as a whole 
demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less strong showing 
is required. IdL at 1205-06. 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517. 
B. The Affidavit Amply Supports the Confidential Informant's 
Reliability and Probable Cause to Search Defendant's Residence, 
Defendant challenges the informant's reliability only on the apparent discrepancy 
between the informant's assertion that the storage unit was rented by a "Steve" and the 
storage complex's listing of the unit to a "Justin Dzinblenski." In fact, the confidential 
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informant told Officer Billings that "Steve," whom he knew to be dealing marijuana, 
rented storage units on a regular basis under fictitious names to store large quantities of 
marijuana, and that defendant had rented the storage unit identified in the affidavit in the 
name of an individual who lived just down the street from defendant (R. 27), 
Particularly, the informant told Officer Billings that "Steve" resided at 172 North, 920 
West in Orem, and police checks of police files, local utility company records and driver 
licence information revealed that a "Steven Knight" lived at the address identified by the 
informant (R. 27). A records check with the management of the storage complex listed a 
Justin Dzinblenski as the renter of the storage unit. The records listed Dzinblenski's 
address as 180 North, 1106 West, Orem, a location just west of defendant's residence, 
located at 172 North, 920 West, Orem (R. 27). Further, the informant told the police that 
defendant was receiving large quantities of marijuana which defendant sometimes paid 
for with guns, information which was inferentially confirmed from a marijuana buy on 
December 21, 1995, involving individuals in possession of a handgun, from which police 
obtained further information leading to the discovery of marijuana in the search of the 
storage units that same night (R. 27). Finally, the informant gave information about the 
marijuana held in the storage unit freely, and all of such information was later shown to 
be accurate (R. 26). See Purser, 828 P.2d at 517 (stating "reliability and veracity are 
generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives nothing from the police 
in exchange for the information"). Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, the entirety of 
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facts recited in the affidavit, but which defendant omits from his discussion, strongly 
support, rather than undermine, the trial court's finding and conclusion that the 
confidential informant was reliable (R. 104-05). 
Defendant also argues that because probable cause for the search of his residence 
was based exclusively on the alleged illegal search of the storage unit and the consequent 
discovery of marijuana, there was insufficient probable cause to search his residence. Br. 
of App. at 22. This claim again disregards the totality of facts set out in the affidavit, 
which facts demonstrate probable cause to search defendant's residence beyond reference 
to the discovery of marijuana. 
| . . - . . • . • . . , 
Finding that the affidavit set out facts supporting probable cause to search 
defendant's house, the trial court wrote: "The affiant had a great deal of information 
regarding the defendants from confidential informants in this case. The determination of 
probable cause by Judge Howard did not turn solely on the fact that the storage unit had 
been searched and that marijuana had been found there" (R. 105). 
In addition to the foregoing facts of the informant's reliability, which necessarily 
constitute part of the probable cause, the record further supports the trial court's finding 
as to the existence of probable cause to search the house: (1) Provo City Police Officers 
knew defendant from prior dealings (R. 27); (2) the marijuana buy occurred at night, a 
time when Officer Billings was aware that defendant conducted most of his narcotic 
transactions (R. 27); (3) the informant advised Officer Billings that defendant had been 
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dealing marijuana for several years and that defendant was often in possession of large 
quantities of marijuana on his person and at his residence (R. 27); Officer Billings had 
information that defendant transported large quantities of marijuana in his vehicle and 
that defendant was known to change storage units on a regular basis to avoid discovery by 
the police (R. 27); (5) the informant told Officer Billings that during the past week he had 
observed defendant with large quantities of marijuana on his person (R. 26); (6) there was 
a marijuana buy involving persons in possession of a gun, a known aspect of defendant's 
nighttime marijuana dealings, the night of December 21, 1995, the same night officers 
sought the warrant for the search of the house (R. 27); and (7) in Officer Billings 
experience, marijuana was likely being packaged at defendant's residence (R. 26). 
These facts, in their entirety, show that the confidential informant provided 
reliable, corroborated information indicating that defendant was dealing marijuana from 
his home. See State v. Doyle. In sum, there was a substantial basis for the magistrate to 
conclude that a search of defendant's home was supported by probable cause. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this %b day of January, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Square, Clocktower Bldg., Provo, Utah 84604, this 3* day of January, 1999.. 
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KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 E. CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
A SEARCH WARRANT 
-vs- : 
A MATTER OF A NARCOTICS : Criminal No. 
INVESTIGATION 
SELF STORAGE USA 
1401 WEST CENTER STREET, 
STORAGE UNITS #172, 173, AND 175 
OREM, UTAH 
Defendants : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
• s s • • 
COUNTY OF UTAH j 
Comes now DEVON JENSEN, having been duly sworn, who deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am a police officer with the Provo Police Department and 
currently assigned to the Special Operations Bureau. As an officer 
I have participated in operations involving the undercover purchase 
of narcotics and/or the arrest of person for substance abuse 
related violations, I have experience working undercover providing 
first hand experience with narcotics trafficking. 
2. That on 12-21-95 your affiant received an anonymous tip 
that 85 pounds of marijuana was being kept in storage units #172, 
173, and 175 at Storage USA, 1401 West Center St., Orem, Utah* 
3. That your affiant, along with NET narcotics officers and 
Deputy Adams of the Utah County Sheriffs Office and his dog Rudy, 
did go to Storage USA at 14 01 West Center in Orem. That Deputy 
Adams deployed his police service dog, Rudy, searching the air 
currence in and about the storage units. Deputy Adams and Rudy 
began the pass of the storage units at the west end of the storage 
complex, walking eastbound by each storage unit. Units #172, 173, 
and 175 are in the center of the storage complex. As police 
service dog Rudy passed by storage unit #175, Rudy indicated the 
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presence of a controlled substance by alerting on the storage unit 
door in Rudy's usual manner* As Deputy Adams and Rudy proceeded 
eastbound by storage unit #173 Rudy again alerted on the storage 
unit door and also on storage unit #172. In the usual manner he 
indicates to Deputy Adams the presence of a controlled substance. 
4. That after Rudy alerted on the three above-listed storage 
units (172, 173, and 175), Deputy Adams walked Rudy east to the end 
of the complex. No other units were alerted on. Deputy Adams then 
deployed police dog Rudy in a second search off lead allowing the 
dog to perform- the search on his own* Rudy went from the east 
farthest unit in the complex and proceeded west without alerting. 
When Rudy got to storage unit #173, he immediately gave a strong 
alert on this storage unit, indicating the presence of a controlled 
substance. 
5. That your affiant found the storage units to have common 
vents that pass through each unit, therefore allowing air currents 
in one storage unit to send the odor of controlled substances to 
the adjacent storage units. 
6. Rudy has been trained as a police dog with specific 
training in the detection of controlled substances. He has been 
trained to exhibit "alerting" type behavior when he detects the 
odor of controlled substances. Rudy began service as a police dog 
with training with handler Grant Ferre at the Alabama Canine Law 
Enforcement Training Center in 1989. Rudy has worked as a police 
dog since that time, participating in hundreds of narcotics 
searches and police encounters. In 1992 he attended the Adlerhorst 
K-9 Course in Riverside California. Rudy has demonstrated 
consistent reliability in detecting controlled substances. 
7. That the address 1401 West Center Street in Orem, Utah is 
a storage unit complex named Storage USA. The storage complex sits 
on the south side of Center Street, west of 1-15. storage units 
#172, 173 and 175 are located in the center of the complex and face 
south. They have orange garage-type doors with the numbers of each 
unit labelled above the door. Each unit has private pad locks. 
8. Due to the fact that this is a business that operates 
during normal business hours, your affiant feels it would be in the 
best interest of the public that officers search these units during 
the night time hours. Furthermore, officers are conducting twenty 
four hours surveillance on these units in order to preserve 
evidence. That accompanied with the fact that they are storage 
units, night time service would be less intrusive than a day time 
service of this warrant. 
9. Your affiant expects to locate additional controlled 
substances, specifically but not limited to, marijuana, and 
associated paraphernalia and any other items associated with the 
distribution, use, manufacture, or possession of illegal controlled 
substances. 
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10. Your affiant respectfully requests that the manager or 
owner of storage USA turn over to police any documentation on the 
storage units to be searched in order for police to establish 
ownership/rental of said units. 
Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by 
this Court authorizing the search of storage units 172, 173 and 175 
of Storage USA, 1401 West Center, Orem, Utah, Utah County for 
presence of controlled substances together with associated 
paraphernalia including items used or capable of being used for the 
storage, use, production or distribution of marijuana and other 
controlled substances to be executed in the night time hours. 
Dated this day of December 1995 .M. 
AFFIANT- Devon Jensen 
Special Investigations 
Subscribed and sworn before me on the day of 
September 1995, . __.M. 
MAGISTRATE 
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KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 E. CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
A SEARCH WARRANT 
-vs- : 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Comes now Russ Billings, having been duly sworn, who deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. Your affiant is a peace officer for the State of Utah, 
Utah County, Provo Police Department and has been so employed since 
July 1, 1990. Your affiant is currently assigned to the Special 
Investigative Services Bureau. That your affiant has received 
training in the recognition of controlled substances, including 
both undercover work and surveillance and controlled transactions. 
Your affiant is familiar with the appearance and methods of 
storage, use, packaging and distribution of controlled substances. 
Your affiant has had training through POST academy in basic 
narcotics investigation and has also received training in Arizona 
in an advanced narcotics school. 
2. On 12-21-95 officers from NET and Prove Police served a 
search warrant in Orem, Utah at 1401 West Center Street, based on 
information from a Confidential Informant (CI#yt)a that a large 
quantity of marijuana would be contained within the storage unit. 
3. Information given by the Confidential Informant (CI#/) 
was that the storage unit contained 85 pounds of marijuana. When 
officers entered this storage unit during the execution of the 
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4. This same Confidential Informant (CI#/£) also gave your 
affiant information that the individual who rented the storage unit 
was known to him only as Steve. Your affiant received information 
from this Confidential Informant that Steve (last name unknown) 
lives at 172 North 92 0 West in Orem, Utah in a two-story gray home. 
5. Your affiant checked with Orem Police Department, as well 
as City Utilities, and received information that the individual 
described to your affiant by the Confidential Informant is Steven 
Knight. Officers are familiar with an individual named Steven 
Knight who has had several dealings with officers in the past. 
Your affiant received information from Orem Police Department that 
Steven Knight, DOB 11-24-77, has prior records with Orem Police 
Department at the above-listed address. Furthermore, driver's 
license information returns to Steven Knight at 172 N. 920 W. , 
Orem, Utah. Utilities information from Orem City lists this 
residence in the name of Howard and Laura Knight, whom your affiant 
found from Orem Police Department to be the legal guardians of 
Steven Knight. 
6. A second Confidential Informant (CI#2) advised officers 
that Steven Knight is receiving large quantities of marijuana from 
another individual in Utah County and sometimes receives/gives 
payment for marijuana with guns. Your affiant received information 
on 12-21-95 that individuals involved with a marijuana transaction 
on this date were in possession of a handgun. This marijuana buy 
lead to the information to obtain the search warrant for the 
storage unit mentioned in #2 and 3 above. Furthermore, this 
marijuana buy took place during the night time hours, as your 
affiant is aware that Steven Knight conducts most narcotic 
transactions during the late evening hours. 
a 
7. Confidential Informant #£ advised your affiant that 
Steven Knight has been dealing marijuana for several years and is 
often in possession of large quantities on his person and at his 
residence. Your affiant also has information that Steven Knight 
transports large quantities of marijuana in his vehicle. The 
Confidential Informant also advised your affiant that Steven Knight 
rents storage units on a regular basis under fictitious names to 
store large quantities of marijuana within the units. Steven 
Knight is known to change storage units on a regular basis, to 
avoid discovery by police. 
8. CI#£ told your affiant that Steven Knight rented the 
storage unit where the search warrant was served in #2 and 3 above 
under a fictitious name of an individual that use to live just down 
the street from Steven Knight. After execution of the search 
warrant at the storage units at 1401 W. Center in Orem, a records 
check with management of those units listed Justin Dzinblenski as 
the renter of said storage unit with an address of 1106 West 180 
North, Orem, Utah. This address is located just west of Steven 
Knight's residence. 
9. That your affiant believes confidential informant #/ to 
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be reliable in that information about the storage units listed in 
items #2 and 3 above lead to the recovery of six pounds of 
marijuana by NET and Provo Police officers. That the informant has 
given no information which has proved to be false. That the 
Confidential Informant freely gave officers the information 
regarding the marijuana contained within the storage unit at 1401 
W. Center, Orem, Utah. 
10. The amounts of marijuana imply possession of amounts for 
use and distribution. Such amounts of marijuana are typically 
packaged in baggies of one ounce or less, quite small in volume. 
Such baggies can quickly or easily be hidden in clothing or 
destroyed if notice is given of intent to search. Moreover, it is 
my experience that persons with a potentially violent disposition 
may react with violence when confronted with a search. Your 
affiant believes that Steven Knight may have a potentially violent 
disposition when confronted by officers in that he advised your 
affiant's Confidential Informant that he carries a gun on a regular 
basis. Entry without notice allows officers to secure the 
residence and effectively preserve officers safety and evidence. 
Furthermore, entry into the residence under the veil of darkness 
will greatly preserve officer safety and preservation of evidence. 
11. Marijuana and Paraphernalia are often kept in vehicles. 
Failure to search the person of individuals present, and vehicles 
located at the residence at time of the execution of this warrant, 
as well as the Defendant's personal vehicles will likely result in 
officers missing important evidence. It is your affiant's 
experience that most of the people encountered with the unlawful 
use of marijuana also occasionally sell, sometimes paying for their 
use with profits from sales. It is so common as to be the rule, 
rather than the exception, to find evidence related to the 
distribution of narcotics whenever marijuana is located within a 
residence. 
12. The residence to be searched is more particularly 
described as a single-family dwelling located at 172 North 920 
West, Orem, Utah, Utah County. It is a two-story home, with gray 
aluminum siding. The residence faces west on 920 West and has the 
numbers "172" posted on a support beam at the front entrance of the 
home. There is an attached two-car garage. 
13. Your affiant expects to locate additional controlled 
substances in the residence together with associated paraphernalia 
including items used or capable of being used for the storage, use, 
production, or distribution of controlled substances. 
Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by 
this court authorizing the search of the residence, the curtilage 
(attached or unattached) together with the person of all 
individuals present within the residence, and all vehicles located 
at said residence at the time of search for presence of controlled 
substances together with associated paraphernalia including items 
used or capable of being used for the storage, use, production or PntA^-
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distribution of marijuana and other controlled substances to be 
executed without notice of intent or authority during the night 
time hours. 
Dated this ^ day of December, 1995 J_.M. 
AFFIANT- Russell Billings 
Officer/Special Investigations 
Subscribed and sworn before me on the ^-^L/ <X? day of 
December 1995, *7~C>*f . jf..M. 
SISTRA1] MAG TE 
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KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 EAST CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY 
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It has been established by oath or 
affirmation made or submitted to me this 
jd^/A£day of December; 1995 that there is 
probable cause to believe the following: 
The property described below: 
was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed; 
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of 
an offense; or 
is evidence of illegal conduct. 
The property described below is most probably 
located at the premises also set forth below. 
The person or entity in possession of the property 
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct. 
That this warrant may be served without notice of 
intent or authority to search, due to the fact that 
the property to be searched for may be easily 
secreted, disposed of, or destroyed if notice of 
intent to search is given. Officers are aware that 
Steven Knight is known to carry a handgun on a 
regular basis based on information from a reliable 
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Confidential Informant, 
That this warrant may be served in the night time 
hours as the delay of this search would result in 
the distribution of the illegal narcotics into the 
community• Furthermore, your affiant is aware that 
Steven Knight conducts most narcotic transactions 
during the late evening hours. 
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to conduct 
a search of the residence described as a single-family dwelling 
located at 172 North 920 West, Orem, Utah, Utah County. It is a 
two-story home, with gray aluminum siding. The residence faces 
west on 920 West and has the numbers "172" posted on a support beam 
at the front entrance of the home. There is an attached two-car 
garage. Your are also hereby directed to conduct a search of 
curtilage, attached or unattached, to the home. 
•You are .also hereby directed to search vehicles, and the person of 
any individuals present at the time of the execution of this 
warrant, including vehicles belonging to those individuals. 
You are directed to search for the presence of the following 
property: controlled substances, together with associated 
paraphernalia, including items used or capable of being used for 
the storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana and 
other controlled substances. 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring 
the property forthwith before me at the above Court or to hold the 
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You 
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person 
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where 
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with 
a written inventory of any property seized identifying the place 
where the property is being held. 
THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED ANY TIME DURING THE NIGHT TIME 
HOURS. 
THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED WITHOUT NOTICE OF INTENT OR 
AUTHORITY OF PURPOSE. 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UT&reQUJJTY^ , K 
STATE OF UTAH ^ ^ ^ ' Deputy 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN H. KNIGHT and 
SPENCER KNIGHT, 
Defendants. 
Case # 961400271 
961400272 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Suppress. A search 
warrant for the residence of the defendants was signed by Judge Fred D. Howard in 
December, 1995. When the search warrant was executed at the residence on December 22, 
1995, controlled substances and paraphernalia were found. This formed the basis for the 
charges filed against the defendants. On March 24, 1997, a Suppression Hearing was held 
and arguments were heard by the Court. On July 11, 1997, an additional Hearing was held 
and arguments regarding the validity of a previous search warrant executed on a storage unit 
and the defendants' standing to object to that search, were heard by the Court. The Court has 
reviewed all evidence, memoranda and the file, and being fully advised in the premises, 
makes the following: 
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RULING 
Reliability of Confidential Informant 
Defendants argue that the evidence should be suppressed because the reliability of the 
confidential informant was not sufficiently established. The reliability of information received 
from informants is one of the factors considered when determining the sufficiency of an 
affidavit in support of a search warrant. A search warrant may be issued when, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the information given by multiple confidential informants is 
sufficient to establish probable cause. State v. Singleton. 851 P.2d 1017 (Utah App. 1993). 
In the instant case, the affidavit in support of the search warrant for the residence of 
the defendants cites information received by the affiant from two confidential informants. It 
states that on December 21,1995, officers served a search warrant on a storage unit in Orem, 
Utah. This search was based on information from a Confidential Informant (CI#2) that a 
large quantity of marijuana (85 pounds) would be contained within the storage unit. When 
the officers executed the warrant, they located six pounds of marijuana. The difference in the 
amount of marijuana found does not make the confidential informant unreliable. Six pounds 
is still a large amount and while there is a difference in the amounts, it is not a significant 
distinction to render the information unreliable. Thus, the information from CI#2 regarding 
the storage unit proved to be reliable. 
Officers were given additional information from CI#2 including information that the 
person who rented the storage unit was known to him only as "Steve" and that this person 
had been dealing marijuana for several years and is often in possession of large quantities on 
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his person and at his residence. Another confidential informant (CI#1) gave the affiant 
information that "Steve" lived at 172 North 920 West in Orem,Utah in a two-story gray 
home. The affiant conducted a sufficient amount of verification both with the Orem Police 
Department, the utilities company, and the driver's license division to determine that the 
individual described to him by the confidential informant was Steven Knight. 
The affiant had a great deal of information regarding the defendants from confidential 
informants in this case. The determination of probable cause by Judge Howard did not turn 
solely on the fact that the storage unit had been searched and that marijuana had been found 
there. 
Search of the Storage Unit 
In its Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the State asserts that Defendants 
do not have standing to challenge the search of the storage unit. In their Additional 
Memorandum in Response to the May 14, 1997 Hearing, Defendants state that they have 
never asserted that the storage unit was not rented by them and have relied on the State's 
arguments and the probable cause affidavit to set forth their standing. At the July 11, 1997 
Hearing, the Court, without ruling on the issue of standing, allowed Defendants* attorney to 
assert standing on behalf of his clients for the purposes of that hearing only. Defendants did 
so and argued that they have never been supplied with a signed copy of the search warrant 
executed on the storage unit. Defendants therefore question whether the warrant was ever 
signed by a magistrate before being executed. At this Hearing, Officer Russell Billings 
testified that he participated in going to the magistrate and having the warrant approved and 
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< 
signed. He further testified that he can, at this time, be sure this warrant was signed because 
he remembers this case and because he has never served a warrant that was unsigned. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that the affiant sufficiently verified the information given to him by 
the confidential informants and given the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that 
the information is reliable. Therefore, there was a basis for Judge Howard's determination of 
probable cause based on the information provided by the confidential informant and the 
affiant's verification of that information. 
Based on the testimony of Officer Billings, the Court finds that there was a valid 
search warrant prepared for the search of the storage unit. Therefore, the Motion to Suppress 
is DENIED. 
Dated this 29 day of July, 1997. 
G 
cc: Shelden Carter, Esq. 
Phillip W. Hadfield, Esq. 
Btf&IlT 
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